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Abstract
We devise a simple modification that essentially doubles the efficiency of a
well-known quantum key distribution scheme proposed by Bennett and Bras-
sard (BB84). Our scheme assigns significantly different probabilities for the
different polarization bases during both transmission and reception to reduce
the fraction of discarded data. The actual probabilities used in the scheme are
announced in public. As the number of transmitted signals increases, the ef-
ficiency of our scheme can be made to approach 100%. An eavesdropper may
try to break such a scheme by eavesdropping mainly along the predominant
basis. To defeat such an attack, we perform a refined analysis of accepted
data: Instead of lumping all the accepted data together to estimate a single
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error rate, we separate the accepted data into various subsets according to
the basis employed and estimate an error rate for each subset individually.
Keywords: Quantum Cryptography, Quantum Key Distribution
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I. INTRODUCTION
As an encryption scheme is only as secure as its key, key distribution is a big prob-
lem in conventional cryptography. Public-key based key distribution schemes such as the
Diffie-Hellman scheme [15] solve the key distribution problem by making computational as-
sumptions such as that the discrete logarithm problem is hard. However, unexpected future
advances in algorithms and hardware (e.g., the construction of a quantum computer [27,28])
may render public-key based schemes insecure. Worse still, this would lead to a retroactive
total security break with disastrous consequences. A big problem in conventional public-
key cryptography is that there is, in principle, nothing to prevent an eavesdropper with
infinite computing power from passively monitoring the key distribution channel and thus
successfully decoding any subsequent communication.
Recently, there has been much interest in using quantum mechanics in cryptography.
[The subject of quantum cryptography was started by S. Wiesner [30] in a paper that was
written in about 1970 but remained unpublished until 1983. For a review on the sub-
ject, see [7].] The aim of quantum cryptography has always been to solve problems that
are impossible from the perspective of conventional cryptography. This paper deals with
quantum key distribution [4,10,16] whose goal is to detect eavesdropping using the laws of
physics. [Another class of applications of quantum cryptography has also been proposed
[6,11]. Those applications are mainly based on quantum bit commitment. However, it
is now known [22,25] that unconditionally secure quantum bit commitment is impossible.
Furthermore, some other quantum cryptographic schemes such as quantum one-out-of-two
oblivious transfer have also been shown to be insecure [21]. For a review, see [13].] In quan-
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tum mechanics, measurement is not just a passive, external process, but an integral part
of the formalism. Indeed, passive monitoring of transmitted signals is strictly forbidden in
quantum mechanics. The quantum no-cloning [14,31] theorem dictates that the copying of
an unknown quantum state would violate linearity, unitarity and causality—three cherished
basic physical principles in quantum mechanics. Moreover, an eavesdropper who is listening
to a channel in an attempt to learn information about quantum states will almost always
introduce disturbance in the transmitted quantum signals [8]. Such disturbance can be de-
tected with high probability by the legitimate users. Alice and Bob will use the transmitted
signals as a key for subsequent communications only when the security of quantum signals
is established (from the low value of error rate).
Various quantum key distribution schemes have been proposed. To illustrate our main
ideas, we will use the most well-known quantum key distribution scheme (BB84) proposed
by Bennett and Brassard [4] in 1984. The details of BB84 will be discussed in the next
section. Here it suffices to note two of its characteristics. Firstly, in BB84 each of the two
users, Alice and Bob, chooses for each photon between two polarization bases randomly (i.e.,
with equal probability) and independently. For this reason, half of the times they are using
different basis, in which case the data are rejected immediately. Consequently, the efficiency
of BB84 is at most 50%. Secondly, a naive error analysis is performed in BB84. All the
accepted data (those that are encoded and decoded in the same basis) are lumped together
and a single error rate is computed.
In contrast, in our present scheme each of Alice and Bob chooses between the two bases
independently but with substantially different probabilities. As Alice and Bob are now much
more likely to be using the same basis, the fraction of discarded data is greatly reduced,
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thus achieving a significant gain in efficiency.
An eavesdropper may try to break this new scheme by eavesdropping mainly along the the
predominant basis. To foil this attack, a refined error analysis is performed. The accepted
data are further divided into two subsets according to the actual basis used by Alice and
Bob and the error rate of each subset is computed separately. We will argue that such a
refined error analysis is necessary and sufficient in ensuring the security of our improved
scheme against such a biased eavesdropping attack.
Our scheme is worth studying for several reasons. Firstly, up till now, only a few quantum
key distribution schemes have been proposed. The construction of any interesting new
scheme is, therefore, a major achievement in itself. Secondly, none of the existing schemes
based on non-orthogonal quantum cryptography has an efficiency more than 50%. [The so-
called orthogonal quantum cryptographic schemes have also been proposed. They use only
a single basis of communication and, according to L. Goldenberg, it is possible to use them
to achieve efficiencies greater than 50% [17,20]. Since they are conceptually quite different
from what we are proposing, we will not discuss them here.] By beating this limit, we can
better understand the fundamental limit to the efficiency of quantum cryptography. Thirdly,
our idea is rather general and can be applied to improve the efficiency of almost all existing
schemes, including the most well-known BB84 scheme. Finally, the efficiency of quantum
cryptography is of practical importance because it may play a crucial role in deciding the
feasibility of practical quantum cryptographic systems in any future application.
In Section 2, we review the BB84 scheme. We introduce our refined error analysis in
Section 3 and show that it generally gives us more power in detecting eavesdropping even
when Alice and Bob choose between the two bases randomly, as in the case of BB84. In
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Section 4, we let each of Alice and Bob choose between the two bases with biased proba-
bilities ε and 1 − ε. We argue in Section 5 that, as far as a biased eavesdropping attack
is concerned, our new scheme does not lead to a compromise of security if a refined error
analysis is performed. We also note that our refined analysis is an essential feature of an
improved scheme. We discuss briefly the subject of privacy amplification against a biased
eavesdropping attack in Section 6. The constraint on ε is derived in Section 7. Section 8 is
a collection of concluding remarks: Firstly, the basic concept of our improved scheme gener-
alizes trivially to some other quantum key distribution schemes such as Ekert’s scheme and
a scheme based on quantum memories. Secondly, the security issues of our scheme against
other attacks are briefly discussed. Finally, the history behind this paper is given.
II. BENNETT AND BRASSARD’S SCHEME (BB84)
In BB84 [4], there are two participants: the sender, Alice, and the receiver, Bob. Alice
prepares and transmits to Bob a batch of photons each of which is in one of the four
possible polarizations: horizontal, vertical, 45-degree and 135-degree. Bob measures the
polarizations at the other end. There are two types of measurements that Bob may perform:
He may measure along the rectilinear basis, thus distinguishing between horizontal and
vertical photons. Alternatively, he may measure along the diagonal basis, thus distinguishing
between the 45-degree and 135-degree photons. However, the laws of quantum physics
strictly forbid Bob to distinguish between the four possibilities with certainty. One way
to think of the situation is that the two polarization bases (rectilinear and diagonal) are
complementary observables. The uncertainty principle of quantum mechanics dictates that
it is impossible to determine these two observables simultaneously.
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Another important feature of quantum mechanics is that a measurement on an unknown
state is generally an irreversible process that erases the original state. Suppose Bob chooses
to measure the polarization of a photon along the rectilinear basis. If the photon initially
happens to be diagonally (i.e., 45-degree or 135-degree) polarized, the measurement will give
a random outcome of being either horizontal or vertical. After the measurement, the photon
becomes rectilinearly polarized (as specified by the measurement outcome) and completely
loses the information on its initial polarization. For our present discussion, it suffices to
remember the fact that a measurement along the wrong basis gives a random outcome.
BB84 requires two communications channels between Alice and Bob. Firstly, there is
a public unjammable classical channel. i.e., it is assumed that everyone, including the
eavesdropper, can listen to the conversations but cannot change the message. In practice,
an authenticated channel should suffice. Second, there is a channel for quantum signals. In
practice, the transmission can be done through free air [3,12,19] or optical fibres [18,26,29].
The quantum channel is assumed to be insecure. i.e., the eavesdropper is free to manipulate
the signals.
In BB84, Alice sends a sequence of photons to Bob. The protocol consists of several
steps:
(1) Alice sends a sequence of photons each in one of the four polarizations (horizontal,
vertical, 45 degrees and 135 degrees) chosen randomly and independently.
(2) For each photon, Bob chooses the type of measurement randomly: along either the
rectilinear or diagonal bases.
(3) Bob records his measurement bases and the results of the measurements.
(4) Subsequently, Bob announces his bases (but not the results) through the public
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unjammable channel that he shares with Alice.
Notice that it is crucial that Bob announces his basis only after his measurement. This
ensures that during the transmission of the signals through the quantum channel the eaves-
dropper Eve does not know which basis to eavesdrop along. Otherwise, Eve can avoid
detection simply by measuring along the same basis used by Bob.
(5) Alice tells Bob which of his measurements have been done in the correct bases.
(6) Alice and Bob divide up their polarization data into two classes depending on whether
they have used the same basis.
Notice that Bob should have performed the wrong type of measurements for, on average,
half of the photons. Here, by a wrong type of measurement we mean that Bob has used a
basis different from that of Alice. For those photons, he gets random outcomes. Therefore,
he throws away those polarization data. We emphasize that this immediately implies that
half of the data are thrown away and the efficiency of BB84 is bounded by 50%.
On the other hand, assuming that no eavesdropping has occurred, all the photons that
are measured by Bob in the correct bases should give the same polarizations as prepared
by Alice. Besides, Bob can determine those polarizations by his own detectors without any
communications from Alice. Therefore, those polarization data are a candidate for their raw
key. However, before they proceed any further, it is crucial that they test for tampering. For
instance, they can use the following simplified method for estimating the error rate. [Going
through BB84 would give us essentially the same result, namely that all accepted data are
lumped together to compute a single error rate.]
(7) Alice and Bob randomly pick a subset of photons from those that are measured in the
correct bases and publicly compare their polarization data for preparation and measurement.
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For those results, they estimate the error rate for the transmission. Of course, since the
polarization data of photons in this subset have been announced, Alice and Bob must sacrifice
those data to avoid information leakage to Eve. [This, however, has little effect on the
efficiency if the total number of the transmitted photons is large.]
We assume that Alice and Bob have some idea on the channel characteristics. If the
average error rate e¯ turns out to be unreasonably large (i.e., e¯ ≥ emax where emax is the
maximal tolerable error rate), then either substantial eavesdropping has occurred or the
channel is somehow unusually noisy. In both cases, all the data are discarded and Alice
and Bob may re-start the whole procedure again. Notice that, even then there is no loss
in security because the compromised key is never used to encipher sensitive data. Indeed,
Alice and Bob will derive a key from the data only when the security of the polarization
data is first established.
On the other hand, if the error rate turns out to be reasonably small (i.e., e¯ < emax),
they go to the next step.
(8) Reconciliation and privacy amplification: Alice and Bob can independently convert
the polarizations of the remaining photons into a raw key by, for example, regarding a
horizontal or 45-degree photon as denoting a ‘0’ and a vertical or 135-degree photon a ‘1’.
There are still two problems [3], namely noise and leakage of information to Eve. Indeed,
the raw key that Alice has may differ slightly from that of Bob. It is important for them
to reconcile their differences by performing error correction (at the cost of throwing away
some polarization data). We shall skip the details of this reconciliation procedure here. Now
Eve may still have partial information on the reconciled string between Alice and Bob. A
realistic scheme must include privacy amplification—the distillation of a shorter but almost
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perfectly secure key out of a raw key that Eve may have partial knowledge of. Privacy
amplification schemes that are secure against single-photon measurements by Eve have been
devised [9]. Let us just mention a useful result on privacy amplification here.
A. A Result on Privacy Amplification
Given a string x of length n, we say that a deterministic bit of information about x is
the value f(x) of an arbitrary function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}. Suppose that there are n bits in
a reconciled string x and Eve has at most l deterministic bits of information about it. The
following result is known [9]: A hash function h can be chosen randomly from an appropriate
class of functions {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n−l−s where s > 0 such that the reconciled string x will
be mapped into h(x) with Eve’s expected information on h(x) less than 2−s/ ln 2 bit. Alice
and Bob can now each compute the value h(x) and keep it as a secret key for subsequent
communication. More powerful theorems on privacy amplification are given in [5] but the
above suffices to handle the biased eavesdropping attack that we analyse here.
III. REFINED ERROR ANALYSIS
In the original BB84 scheme, all the accepted data (those for which Alice and Bob
measure along the same basis) are lumped together to compute a single error rate. In this
Section, we introduce a refined error analysis. The idea is for Alice and Bob to divide up
the accepted data into two subsets according to the actual basis (rectilinear or diagonal)
used. After that, a random subset of photons is drawn from each of the two sets. They then
publicly compare their polarization data and from there estimate the error rate for each
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basis separately. They demand that the run is acceptable if and only if both error rates are
sufficiently small.
In more detail, we keep steps 1) to 5) of BB84 described in Section 2.
6) Recall that each of Alice and Bob uses the two bases—rectilinear and diagonal—
randomly. Alice and Bob divide up their polarization data into four cases according to the
actual bases used. They then throw away the two cases when they have used different bases.
The remaining two cases are kept for further analysis.
7) From the subset where they both use the rectilinear basis, Alice and Bob randomly
pick a fixed number say m1 photons and publicly compare their polarizations. The number
of mismatches r1 tells them the estimated error rate e1 = r1/m1. Similarly, from the subset
where they both use the diagonal basis, Alice and Bob randomly pick a fixed number say
m2 photons and publicly compare their polarizations. The number of mismatches r2 gives
the estimated error rate e2 = r2/m2.
Provided that the test samples m1 and m2 are sufficiently large, the estimated error rates
e1 and e2 should be rather accurate. [The difference between the estimated error rates from
the theoretical error rates can be computed from classical probability theory.] Now they
demand that e1, e2 < emax where emax is a prescribed maximal tolerable error rate. If these
two independent constraints are satisfied, they proceed to step 8). Otherwise, they throw
away the polarization data and re-start the whole procedure from step 1).
8) Reconciliation and privacy amplification: This step is the same as in BB84.
Notice that the two constraints e1, e2 < emax are more stringent than the original naive
prescription e¯ < emax in BB84. To understand this point, consider the following example of
a so-called biased eavesdropping strategy by Eve.
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A. Biased Eavesdropping Strategy
For each photon, Eve 1) with a probability p1 measures its polarization along the rec-
tilinear basis and resends the result of her measurement to Bob; 2) with a probability p2
measures its polarization along the diagonal basis and resends the result of her measurement
to Bob; and 3) with a probability 1 − p1 − p2, does nothing. We remark that, by varying
the values of p1 and p2, Eve has a whole class of eavesdropping strategies. Let us call any
of the strategies in this class a biased eavesdropping attack.
Suppose Alice and Bob know beforehand that the channel error rate is roughly 2%. They
may decide the maximal tolerable error rate to be 3% in BB84. What does this requirement
translate to as constraints on p1 and p2?
Let us compute the error rate for the two bases separately. When both Alice and Bob use
the rectilinear basis, errors occur only if Eve eavesdrops along the wrong (i.e., diagonal) basis.
This happens with a probability p2. And when Eve uses the wrong basis, the polarization
of the photon is randomized. Subsequently, Bob gets an incorrect answer with a probability
1/2. Multiplying the two probabilities gives us the error rate e1 = p2/2 for the rectilinear
basis. A similar argument shows that the error rate for the diagonal basis is e2 = p1/2.
Now in BB84, all the accepted data are lumped together and a single error rate is
computed. Since the two bases are chosen with equal probability, the single error rate is
given by
e¯ = (e1 + e2)/2 = (p1 + p2)/4. (1)
Therefore, the requirement that e¯ < 3% translates to (p1 + p2) < 12%.
Now consider our refined error analysis. By computing the two error rates e1 and e2 sepa-
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rately, it may be natural to require (for a channel symmetric with respect to the interchange
of the two bases) that e1, e2 < 3% individually. Now the two requirements e1, e2 < 3%
translate into the two constraints p1, p2 < 6%. They are clearly more stringent than the
single constraint (p1 + p2) < 12%. For instance, the case when p1 = 0 and p2 = 9% violates
our improved scheme and will, thus, be rejected whereas it is acceptable to BB84.
The usefulness of such a refined error analysis will be discussed for our efficient scheme
in Section 5.
IV. BIAS
The refined error analysis introduced in the last section is one of the two crucial ingre-
dients of the improved scheme. This section concerns the second ingredient—putting a bias
in the probabilities of choosing between the two bases.
Recall the fraction of rejected data of BB84 is at least 50 %. This is because in BB84
Alice and Bob choose between the two bases randomly and independently. Consequently,
on average Bob performs a wrong type of measurement half of the time and, therefore, half
of the photons are thrown away immediately. Here, we propose a simple modification that
essentially doubles the efficiency of BB84. More specifically, we replace steps 1) and 2) of
BB84 described in Section 2 by the following procedure:
1′) Alice and Bob pick a number 0 < ε ≤ 1/2 whose value is made public. [Because
of the symmetry between the interchange of the two bases under ε ↔ 1 − ε, there is no
need to consider ε > 1/2.] The value of ε should be small but non-zero. The limit ε → 0
is singular as the scheme is insecure when ε = 0. The constraint on the value ε will be
discussed in Section 7. Now for each photon Alice chooses between the two bases, rectilinear
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and diagonal, with probabilities ε and 1− ε respectively.
2′) Similarly, Bob measures the polarization of the received photon along the rectilinear
and diagonal bases with probabilities ε and 1− ε respectively.
We remark that BB84 is a special case of our scheme when ε = 1/2. In the general case,
however, the bases used by Alice and Bob agree with a probability ε2 + (1− ε)2 which goes
to 1 as ε goes to zero. Hence, the efficiency is asymptotically doubled when compared to
BB84.
Notice also that the bias in the probabilities may be produced passively by an apparatus,
for example, an unbalanced beamsplitter. Such a passive implementation eliminates the need
for fast switching between different polarization bases and is, thus, useful in experiments.
V. REFINED ERROR ANALYSIS IS NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT FOR
FOILING THE BIASED EAVESDROPPING ATTACK
The big question is security. Naively, one might think that the knowledge of ε can
be exploited by the eavesdropper to devise a fatal attack. We remark that this would
have been the case if a naive error analysis (i.e., the estimation of a single error rate) as
prescribed in BB84 had been used. Except for Section 8, we shall consider only the biased
eavesdropping attack presented in Subsection 3A. Consider the error rate e1 for the case
when both Alice and Bob use the rectilinear basis. For the biased eavesdropping strategy
under current consideration, errors occur only if Eve uses the diagonal basis. This happens
with a conditional probability p2. In this case, the polarization of the photon is randomized,
thus giving an error rate e1 = p2/2. Similarly, errors for the diagonal basis occur only if
Eve is measuring along the rectilinear basis. This happens with a conditional probability
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p1 and when it happens, the photon polarization is randomized. Hence, the error rate
for the diagonal basis e2 = p1/2. Therefore, Alice and Bob will find that, for the biased
eavesdropping attack of Section 3A, the average error rate
e¯ =
ε2e1 + (1− ε)
2e2
ε2 + (1− ε)2
=
ε2p2 + (1− ε)
2p1
2[ε2 + (1− ε)2]
. (2)
Suppose Eve always eavesdrops solely along the diagonal basis (i.e., p1 = 0 and p2 = 1),
then
e¯ =
ε2
2[ε2 + (1− ε)2]
→ 0 (3)
as ε tends to 0. Hence, with the original error estimation method in BB84, Alice and Bob
will fail to detect eavesdropping by Eve. Yet, Eve will have much information about Alice
and Bob’s raw key as she is always eavesdropping along the dominant (diagonal) basis.
Hence, a naive error analysis fails miserably.
However, the key point of this paper is the following observation: The refined error anal-
ysis introduced in Section 3 can make our scheme secure against such a biased eavesdropping
attack. Recall that in a refined error analysis, the two error rates are computed separately.
The key observation is that these two error rates e1 = p2/2 and e2 = p1/2 depend only on
Eve’s eavesdropping strategy, but not on the value of ε! This is so because they are condi-
tional probabilities. This fact is valid not only for the above biased eavesdropping strategy,
but also for any single-photon eavesdropping strategy. See Section 8 for a discussion.
More concretely, suppose we demand that both e1 and e2 are sufficiently small, say less
than 3%, we have put a severe constraint on the amount of information leaked to Eve. For
example, for the biased eavesdropping strategy under current consideration, the requirements
e1, e2 < 3% translate into p1, p2 < 6%. Thus, for those strategies, Eve has at most only 6%
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of the information sent by Alice.
VI. RECONCILIATION AND PRIVACY AMPLIFICATION
Now suppose N photons are sent from Alice to Bob. Most of them (a fraction of about
ε2 + (1 − ε)2) will be accepted data. The reconciliation will lead to some further loss in
efficiency, but not too much. Suppose the reconciled key x is of length aN where a < 1 is,
nonetheless, significantly larger than 1/2. Alice and Bob can conservatively estimate the
information leakage to Eve to be N(6% + δ) where δ is a small positive number that takes
into account the potential error in the statistical estimation of the error rate and its value can
be computed simply from classical probability theory. The result on privacy amplification in
Subsection 2A shows that Alice and Bob can choose a hash function randomly and publicly
from a class of function to distill out a key h(x) of length N(a − 6% − δ) − s where s > 0
with the confidence that Eve’s expected information is less than 2−s/ln2 bits. Now h(x) is
highly secure and can be used a key for subsequent communication. The key observation
is that, for sufficiently small ε, the length of h(x) can be larger than N/2, thus decisively
beating the 50% efficiency limit set by BB84.
This shows that our scheme is perfectly secure against a biased eavesdropping attack.
The security of our scheme against other attacks is briefly discussed in Section 8.
VII. CONSTRAINT ON ε.
Of course, if ε were actually zero, the improved scheme would be insecure because Eve
could simply eavesdrop along the diagonal axis. However, we emphasize that the limit ε→ 0
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is singular and that for non-zero ε, secure schemes do exist. A natural question to ask is:
What is the constraint on ε? The main constraint is that one needs to make sure that there
are enough photons for an accurate estimation of the two error rates e1 and e2. Suppose
N photons are transmitted from Alice to Bob. On average, only Nε2 photons belong to
the case where both Alice and Bob use the rectilinear basis. To estimate e1 reasonably
accurately, one needs to make sure that this number Nε2 is larger than some fixed number
say m1. The key point to note is that the number m1 depends on e1 and the desired accuracy
of the estimation but not on N . (Indeed, the number m1 can be computed from classical
statistical analysis.) In summary, one needs:
Nε2 ≥ m1
ε ≥
√
m1/N. (4)
As N tends to infinity, ε can be made to go to zero but never quite reach it. Notice that the
asymptotic limit ε→ 0 corresponds to 100% efficiency. In conclusion, the improved scheme
is asymptotically the most efficient scheme that one can possibly devise.
VIII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In BB84, each of Alice and Bob chooses between the two bases (rectilinear and diagonal)
with equal probability. Consequently, Bob’s measurement basis differs from that of Alice’s
half of the time. For this reason, half of the polarization data are useless and are thus
thrown away immediately. We have presented a simple modification that can essentially
double the efficiency of BB84. There are two important ingredients in this modification.
The first ingredient is for each of Alice and Bob to assign significantly different probabilities
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(say ε and 1 − ε respectively where ε is small but non-zero) to the two polarization bases
(rectilinear and diagonal respectively). Consequently, they are much more likely to use the
same basis. This decisively enhances efficiency.
However, an eavesdropper may try to break such a scheme by eavesdropping mainly along
the predominant basis. To make the scheme secure against such a biased eavesdropping
attack, it is crucial to have the second ingredient—a refined error analysis—in place. The
idea is the following. Instead of lumping all the accepted polarization data into one set
and computing a single error rate (as in BB84), we divide up the data into various subsets
according to the actual polarization bases used by Alice and Bob. In particular, the two error
rates for the cases 1) when both Alice and Bob use the rectilinear basis and 2) when both
Alice and Bob use the diagonal basis, are computed separately. It is only when both error
rates are small that they accept the security of the transmission. We have demonstrated that
this refined analysis is necessary and sufficient in guaranteeing the security of our improved
scheme against a biased eavesdropping attack.
We remark that our idea of efficient schemes of quantum key distribution applies also to
other schemes such as Ekert’s scheme [16] and Biham, Huttner and Mor’s scheme [10] which
is based on quantum memories.
As a side remark, Alice and Bob may use different biases in their choices of probabilities.
In other words, our idea still works if Alice chooses between the two bases with probabilities
ε and 1− ε and Bob chooses with probabilities ε′ and 1− ε′ where ε 6= ε′.
So far our discussion on security has been restricted to a biased eavesdropping attack.
What about its security against other attacks? Indeed, it is a highly non-trivial problem
to work out security even for the standard BB84 scheme, and even if we restrict the eaves-
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dropper to attacking Alice’s photons one by one. We certainly do not claim to have fully
worked out the security of our new scheme. However, in the near future, it is plausible
that single-photon-measurement attacks by Eve will be the only realistic class of attacks.
It would be interesting to prove that our scheme is at least as secure as BB84 against any
such restricted attack. This hope is reasonable because any single-photon-measurement
eavesdropping strategy gives characteristic error rates e1 and e2 independent of the value
of ε. This is so because they are conditional probabilities. Consequently, it is intuitively
plausible that Eve cannot exploit her knowledge of ε to avoid detection of her tampering
attempt.
Finally, a piece of history on this paper. Apparently, the possibility of having more
efficient quantum key distribution schemes was first raised by one of us (M. Ardehali) in an
unpublished manuscript [1]. Unfortunately, the crucial importance of a refined error analysis
was not recognized. As pointed out by G. Brassard, the security of that scheme remained
unproven. The use of a refined error analysis was first discussed by Barnett and Phoenix [2]
for rejected data. Two of us (H.-K. Lo and H. F. Chau), however, noted [23] the important
fact that when a refined error analysis is applied to accepted data, an improved scheme can
be made secure.
We thank Gilles Brassard for helpful discussions and suggestions.
Notes Added: An entanglement-based scheme with an efficiency greater than 50% has also
been discussed in a recent preprint by two of us [24].
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